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Population mobility is a main factor in globalization of 
public health threats and risks, speciﬁ  cally distribution of an-
timicrobial drug–resistant organisms. Drug resistance is a 
major risk in healthcare settings and is emerging as a prob-
lem in community-acquired infections. Traditional health 
policy approaches have focused on diseases of global pub-
lic health signiﬁ   cance such as tuberculosis, yellow fever, 
and cholera; however, new diseases and resistant organ-
isms challenge existing approaches. Clinical implications 
and health policy challenges associated with movement 
of persons across barriers permeable to products, patho-
gens, and toxins (e.g., geopolitical borders, patient care 
environments) are complex. Outcomes are complicated by 
high numbers of persons who move across disparate and 
diverse settings of disease threat and risk. Existing policies 
and processes lack design and capacity to prevent or miti-
gate adverse health outcomes. We propose an approach to 
global public health risk management that integrates popu-
lation factors with effective and timely application of policies 
and processes. 
H
uman mobility is causing an increase in antimicrobial 
drug–resistant organisms and drug-resistant infectious 
diseases. International population movement is an integral 
component of the globalization process. Current population 
movement dynamics rapidly and effectively link regions of 
marked health disparity, and these linkages can be associ-
ated with risk for importation of drug-resistant infectious 
diseases.
During the past century, developments in public health 
sanitation (1), infrastructure engineering (2), vaccines (3), 
and antimicrobial drugs have contributed substantially to 
the control of infectious diseases, markedly decreasing as-
sociated illness and death. These developments have large-
ly occurred in economically advanced regions and have 
produced complacency and a belief that the public health 
threats posed by infectious diseases have been conquered. 
However, by the early 1990s, infectious diseases were 
again being identiﬁ  ed as substantial domestic and interna-
tional public health threats in and to western nations (4).
Although many infections of clinical relevance are ef-
fectively managed with the use of vaccines, antimicrobial 
drugs, or newer therapies, challenges to the control of infec-
tious diseases remain. These challenges occur in industrial-
ized and in developing countries and result at least in part 
from the failure of antimicrobial drugs to meet expectations 
for management and control of disease in clinical and public 
health contexts. Declining antimicrobial drug effectiveness 
has current and future consequences that affect all elements 
of the health sector, e.g., research and development, public 
health policy, service delivery, and payment programs. The 
emergence of antimicrobial drug resistance adversely af-
fects patient care and threatens effective management of 
public health infectious diseases globally (5).
Antimicrobial drug failure may occur for many rea-
sons, e.g., reduced adherence to drug therapy, suboptimal 
dosing, diagnostic and laboratory error, ineffective infec-
tion control, counterfeit or altered drugs, and resistance 
(innate or acquired). Although much attention is focused 
on resistance patterns of eubacteria (6), resistance is being 
found for virtually all microbial agents including myco-
bacteria (7,8), viruses (9,10), parasites (11,12), and fungi 
(13,14). Antimicrobial drug resistance phenotype is com-
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monly described in terms of the resistance characteristics 
of the microorganism. These characteristics are either con-
stitutionally based intrinsic characteristics of the organism 
or resistance factors acquired through induced genetic ex-
pression or gene transfer between organisms.
Human activities strongly affect acquired resistance. 
Emergence of drug resistance in environments that en-
able sharing of drug-resistance genes between organisms 
has been documented. Human activities that contribute to 
ecological niche pressures, such as antimicrobial drug use 
(15) and manufacturing or biological waste disposal into 
the environment (16,17), can support the development of 
resistance.
Against this background of diverse antimicrobial drug 
resistance, interregional migration and the processes asso-
ciated with international population mobility can affect the 
spread and distribution of resistant organisms. These mech-
anisms of spread become increasingly common when peo-
ple move among locations with disparate delivery of health 
services, public health systems, and regulatory frameworks 
for therapeutic drugs, particularly antimicrobial agents. We 
describe the role of population mobility in the dispersal of 
drug-resistant organisms and the emerging need for global 
standards, programs, and policies in the management of 
drug resistance, especially for mobile populations.
Population Mobility and Association with 
Infectious Diseases and Microbial Resistance
Each year, ≈2 billion persons move across large geo-
graphic distances; approximately half cross international 
boundaries (Table). The International Air Transport As-
sociation reported that their members carried 1.6 billion 
passengers in 2007, among which 699 million ﬂ  ew interna-
tionally (24). The United Nations World Tourism Organi-
zation estimated 924 million international tourist arrivals in 
2008 (19). International movements for permanent resettle-
ment by immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, or refugee 
claimants, and temporary movement by migrant workers 
and others augment the total international movements each 
year. The International Labour Organization stated that in 
2004, an estimated 175 million persons (3% of the world’s 
population) lived permanently outside their country of birth 
and that there were 81 million migrant workers (excluding 
refugees) globally (22).
Despite the magnitude of mobile populations, translat-
ing international movement statistics into imported disease 
risk is challenging for several reasons. Domestic surveil-
lance systems generally report disease events and only 
occasionally refer to infection in the context of place of 
acquisition. Patients’ travel or migration history may not 
be routinely gathered as part of the reporting requirements. 
Nevertheless, considerable information supports the belief 
that international population mobility plays a role in intro-
ducing antimicrobial drug–resistant disease, as follows.
Human Travel to Disease-Nonendemic or 
Low Disease–Endemicity Regions
Mobile population importation of drug-resistant in-
fections and diseases is most evident where the expected 
frequency of the infection or disease is low or absent. For 
diseases in nonendemic areas, it can be fairly assumed that 
humans imported the disease. Many examples of imported 
multidrug-resistant (MDR) infectious diseases are asso-
ciated with migrant populations, e.g., MDR Plasmodium 
falciparum malaria in immigrants, tourists, and returned 
foreign-born travelers (25–27). Tuberculosis in regions of 
low disease endemicity, such as western Europe and North 
America, is also related to the inﬂ  ux of persons from tuber-
culosis-hyperendemic areas (28). Tuberculosis in foreign-
born persons can shift the local disease epidemiology from 
endemic to imported and includes the risk for MDR TB 
(29–32) and extensively drug-resistant (XDR) TB (33,34).
Geographic Tracking of Human-to-Human Transmitted 
Diseases and Drug Resistance over Time
The emergence of high-level resistance to penicillin 
G by Streptococcus pneumoniae, ﬁ  rst described in South 
Africa in 1977, followed by resistance to multiple drugs is 
an example of international tracking of human-to-human 
disease and this organism over almost 4 decades. Modern 
molecular microbiologic techniques are now being used to 
conﬁ  rm its global spread (35).
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Table. Global estimates of annual migrant populations 
Administrative category   Population estimates and year  Reference
Refugees 16 million in 2007  (18)
Asylum seekers or refugee claimants  650,000 in 2007  (18)
Internally displaced persons  51 million in 2007, includes those displaced by natural 
disasters and conflict 
(18)
Temporary (recreational or business travel) movement  924 million in 2008  (19)
Regular immigrants  Annual flow of 2.4 million, reported in 2005 (from a stock of 
200 million immigrants worldwide) 
(20)
International students  2.1 million in 2003  (21)
Migrant workers  81–86 million in 2005  (22)
Trafficked (across international borders) persons  Estimated 800,000 in 2006  (23)
Domestic arrivals, by air  Estimated 900 million in 2007  (24)Mobility, Globalization, and Drug Resistance
Similar studies have been conducted on the interna-
tional spread of drug-resistant gonorrhea (36,37).  Neis-
seria gonorrhoeae resistant to penicillin, tetracycline, and 
multiple other drugs, detected in Southeast Asia during the 
1960s and 1970s, has been an emerging public health issue 
in the United States (38,39). The reported emergence of 
quinolone-resistant gonorrhea in the United States (40) fol-
lowed a similar pattern of reactive public health response 
to the contribution of human mobility to international and 
then intranational spread. Successive treatment guidelines 
emphasize the importance of population mobility and the 
dispersal of resistant organisms in this illness (reference 41 
in online Technical Appendix, available from www.cdc.
gov/EID/content/15/11/1727-Techapp.pdf). The conver-
gence of a resistant threat with decreased access to effec-
tive alternative therapy (ceﬁ  xime shortage) during 2002–
2003 complicated management and control (reference 42 
in online Technical Appendix). Increasingly, development 
of clinical management guidelines for diagnosing and treat-
ing illness caused by many resistant organisms will refer to 
international differences in drug-resistance patterns (refer-
ence 43 in online Technical Appendix).
Since multidrug– or methicillin–resistant Staphylococ-
cus aureus (MRSA) was ﬁ  rst reported in the United States 
in 1968, its prevalence in North American healthcare in-
stitutions has grown, contributing to increased (number 
and duration) hospital stays and an associated increased 
number and severity of cases and more deaths (references 
44,45 in online Technical Appendix). Recent descriptions 
of primary community-associated MRSA infections caus-
ing death have raised concerns about the control and man-
agement of this organism in not only North America but 
other locales worldwide as well (references 46,47 in online 
Technical Appendix). Clinical and laboratory testing can 
link distant disease exposures to local isolation of resistant 
strains (references 48–50 in online Technical Appendix). 
A worrying development of antimicrobial drug resistance 
in S. aureus has been the emergence and geographic ex-
tension of reduced susceptibility to vancomycin, which at 
one time was the reliable backup therapy for MRSA in-
fections (references 51–53 in online Technical Appendix). 
Although MRSA is not uniquely a human pathogen, the 
nature of its clinical distribution and ability to be carried in 
asymptomatic persons supports its association with human-
to-human transmission over large distances.
Humans as Asymptomatic Carriers or Mobile Vectors 
of Antimicrobial Drug–Resistant Organisms
As with MRSA, humans can asymptomatically carry 
and transmit other cutaneous, enteric, or respiratory micro-
bial ﬂ  ora from zones of high to low prevalence. Some of 
these organisms may have innate drug resistance or may 
reﬂ  ect acquired resistance patterns that are not typical of 
locally acquired disease. Typhoid disease, Shigella, and 
Campylobacter infections are a few of many other enteric 
infections for which humans are documented carriers (ref-
erences 54–56 in online Technical Appendix).
Recently, the potential for drug-resistant inﬂ  uenza 
viruses with emergent and pandemic potential has cap-
tured considerable global health attention (references 
57–59 in online Technical Appendix). The local appear-
ance of novel inﬂ  uenza strains with rapid global distri-
bution raises questions about the role of human mobility 
in the spread and distribution of drug-resistant viruses 
(reference 60 in online Technical Appendix). Although 
local antiviral drug pressure is associated with rapid ap-
pearance of resistance, drug-resistant strains of inﬂ  uenza 
have also been associated with importation (reference 61 
in online Technical Appendix).
The role of international tourists, travelers, or migrants 
colonized with antimicrobial drug–resistant organisms, in 
terms of transmission potential when they arrive in areas of 
a low disease prevalence, is difﬁ  cult to detect and largely 
unexplored (reference 62 in online Technical Appendix). 
The reality of this risk is illustrated when persons obtain 
healthcare services outside their normal place of residence. 
Wounded military personnel and a group often referred to 
as medical tourists are at increased risk of acquiring noso-
comial infections caused by drug-resistant organisms and 
of subsequently importing their infections when they repa-
triate to their country of residency.
Additionally, the role of international facilities that 
provide dental, surgical, medical, diagnostic, and therapeu-
tic services to international travelers is expanding (refer-
ence 63 in online Technical Appendix). Health services in 
other countries may be provided in regulatory and standard-
ization environments that differ from those at the patients’ 
place of origin. The estimated risk for hospital-acquired in-
fections in developing countries is 2–20× greater than that 
in industrialized countries (reference 64 in online Tech-
nical Appendix). Antimicrobial drug–resistance patterns 
may also differ, as may health services, infection control 
practices, and public health requirements for surveillance 
and reporting of antimicrobial drug resistance. The exten-
sion and transfer of nosocomial infections between regions 
and within the community has been well documented at 
the national level (references 65–67 in online Technical 
Appendix). As more high-risk and vulnerable populations 
travel internationally, either requiring or planning medical 
or surgical care abroad, or as migrants enter countries seek-
ing healthcare services not available in their own countries, 
the international consequences of imported drug-resistant 
infections will be seen more frequently. 
In some scenarios, linking the emergence of antimi-
crobial drug resistance and international mobility can be 
challenging. Given the global prevalence of many com-
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mon organisms, their role in causing infections in high-risk 
populations (e.g., the elderly and patients with concurrent 
conditions such as diabetes, renal failure, malignancy, or 
immune compromise or patients who have had abdominal 
surgery) or certain institutional environments (e.g., inten-
sive care units, burn units, long-term care facilities) may 
create similar local pressures potentially leading to multifo-
cal emergence of drug resistance. Regardless of whether si-
multaneous multifocal emergence of resistance is a factor, 
unaffected areas will be linked to affected areas through 
mobilization of persons from zones of high to low preva-
lence. Microbial identiﬁ  cation and typing systems, antibio-
grams, and new technologies for identifying genetic clones 
and “ﬁ  ngerprints” of microbes are better at deﬁ  ning the ori-
gin and patterns of spread of MDR organisms.
Local monitoring of susceptibility patterns combined 
with knowledge of emerging drug resistance, regionally or 
internationally, is already recognized as a component of 
some resistant infections such as MDR TB and XDR TB. 
Growing population mobility makes local monitoring an 
increasingly important component of routine surveillance 
for antimicrobial resistance.
Role of International Policies, Processes, 
and Globalization in the Control of Imported 
Antimicrobial Drug–Resistant Diseases
Since development of the ﬁ  rst international maritime 
sanitation regulations in 1832, coordinated international 
responses have been required to manage common threats. 
Such undertakings have always had to balance the beneﬁ  ts 
of mitigation with the negative effects of disease control in-
terventions on international trade and commerce (reference 
68 in online Technical Appendix). The modern version of 
these regulations, the International Health Regulations, 
focuses on a limited number of diseases and outbreaks of 
international public health signiﬁ  cance for surveillance and 
reporting but only peripherally addresses population mo-
bility and drug-resistance patterns (reference 69 in online 
Technical Appendix).
The association of international movements of con-
veyances, goods, and people with introductions of disease 
and vectors has been long recognized (references 70–71 
in online Technical Appendix). Human travel, trade, and 
commerce have frequently been implicated in the redistri-
bution of diseases. Examples include yellow fever in the 
18th and 19th centuries, anopheline mosquito malaria vec-
tors in the 1930s, and, more recently, Aedes albopictus and 
dengue, the extension of West Nile Virus infection into 
North America, and the spread of chikungunya infections 
in Europe (references 72–76 in online Technical Appen-
dix). No speciﬁ  c antimicrobial therapies are available for 
yellow fever, dengue, West Nile, and chikungunya viruses, 
among others. Expanding human population mobility will 
affect and inﬂ  uence the spread, introduction, and endemic-
ity of resistant and untreatable microbes because infections 
are unequally and rather unpredictably distributed around 
the world.
Proposed Approach to Global 
Public Health Risk Management
As recently demonstrated by inﬂ   uenza A pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus, the volume, rapidity, and complexity 
of international movements exceed current international 
disease control practices (reference 77 in online Technical 
Appendix). Effective responses require engagement of local 
capacities, standardization of practices, multisectorial part-
nerships, and rigorous health intelligence with threat and 
risk assessment. The spread and introduction of resistant in-
fections may not be preventable; but planning, recognition, 
and coordinated response can mitigate the consequences. 
Speciﬁ  cally, to control antimicrobial drug resistance and in-
ternational movement of disease risk associated with human 
mobility, greater international collaboration and standard-
ization are needed in the following areas:
•  Prescriber education, training, and invigilation in 
terms of antimicrobial drug stewardship for good 
patient care and reduction of risk for emerging drug 
resistance.
•  Infection control training, certiﬁ  cation,  and 
practice.
•  Laboratory methods, proﬁ  ciency testing, and quality 
management.
•  Active and passive surveillance systems, including 
routine gathering of travel and migration history, 
rapid analysis, and reporting.
•  Engagement of process and regulatory tools unrelated 
to public health but related to health outcomes, e.g., 
good manufacturing practices and quality systems 
for medical devices and pharmaceuticals (references 
78,79 in online Technical Appendix).
•  Pharmaceutical security systems for standard and 
quality medicines. (The importance of this issue 
relevant to drug effectiveness, patient safety, and 
emergence of resistance appeared in a United States 
Pharmacopeia drug quality report from countries 
associated with the US Agency for International 
Development; the report indicated that antibiotic 
drugs, antimalarial drugs, antituberculous drugs, and 
antiretroviral agents for treatment of HIV/AIDS were 
found to be commonly substandard or counterfeit 
[reference 80 in online Technical Appendix]. Even in 
industrialized countries, counterfeit drugs may enter 
the marketplace either directly from local illegal 
producers or through international portals such as 
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importation or Internet pharmacy access [references 
81–83 in online Technical Appendix.])
•  Animal and plant health sector engagement. (Not 
only do subtherapeutic, subquality antiinfective 
therapies and low-level environmental antimicrobial 
drugs affect illness and death at the human level, but 
they also have the potential for emergence of drug 
resistance at the microbial level [references 84–88 
in online Technical Appendix.])
Although all the above-listed efforts are essential, 
none will be sufﬁ  cient without integrating the role played 
by humans and their international movement into modeling 
the complex relationship with antimicrobial drug resistance 
and microorganisms (reference 89 in online Technical Ap-
pendix). Enhanced global surveillance and population map-
ping demarcating differential zones of disease prevalence 
and major health disparities will support targeted interven-
tions such as routine drug sensitivity analyses for infections 
originating in certain situations.
Acknowledging the dynamic role of population mobil-
ity in emerging risks to public health is a ﬁ  rst step in formu-
lating an effective response, but other components will be 
needed if this risk is to be successfully mitigated (reference 
90 in online Technical Appendix). Components of this re-
sponse will include the following:
•  Accurate and robust assessment of threat to 
risk management based on modern population 
characteristics that include mobility, travel, and 
migration history.
•  Mitigation of risk through nonhealth partnerships 
in other sectors, including economics and trade, 
education, agriculture, and security, all of which will 
affect the determinants of health, regional disease 
outcomes, and critical decision making for effective 
intervention and control.
• Augmenting local knowledge and timely 
communications related to populations expressing 
emerging disease threats and risks and linking early 
detection through diagnostic and conﬁ  rmatory 
epidemiologic tools and medical technology.
Conclusions
Although the association of human movement with 
antimicrobial drug resistance is not new, the extent of 
risk to public health caused by population mobility and 
drug-resistant infections is increasing. A shift in the exist-
ing paradigm of pathogen-focused policies and programs 
would contribute to a healthier future for everyone. The 
shift should address population mobility as a part of an in-
tegrated approach to decrease globalization of infectious 
disease threats and risks.
Dr MacPherson is a clinician, laboratorian, researcher, and 
advisor to multiple governments and agencies on population 
health issues. His primary interest is advocating for “people ﬁ  rst” 
in all aspects of medicine. 
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